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Flawed Foreign Policy: Hypocritical




Hypocrisy is easier to attack than evil.
-Unknown
Introduction
The United States government is adamantly opposed to the 1998
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), a treaty
that is expected to create an international court empowered to
prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes by the end of 2002.' In fact, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the American Service Members Protection
Act ("ASPA") in May 2001.2 In accordance with Bush
Administration policy, the sole purpose of ASPA was to undermine
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. and B.S.B.A., Washington
University. I would like to thank all of my family and friends for their support and
encouragement, with special thanks to my mother and father, whose inexhaustible love
and endless sacrifice have made me the person I am today.
1. See generally H.R. 1794, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); S. 1610, 107th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2001); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, "Scare Tactics" on International Court
Denounced, at http:l/vww.hrw.orgpress/200006/icc-0614.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter "Scare Tactics"]; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Congress Backs Away
From Passing Strong Anti-ICC Legislation, Remaining Language Reveals Softer Yet
Continued U.S. Opposition to the ICC, at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/Hyde
Amendment.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Anti-ICC].




international cooperation with the ICC, and on December 7, 2001,
the Senate passed a more strident version of ASPA by a vote of 78-21.3
Taken together, the bills serve several anti-ICC functions. For
instance, by prohibiting any U.S. cooperation with the ICC, ASPA
versions I and II require immunity from the ICC before U.S. troops
are allowed to be involved in UN peacekeeping missions, limit
foreign aid to allies unless they sign accords preventing U.S. troops
within their borders from being delivered to the ICC, and grant the
President the power to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to
free any American detained by the ICC.4
While Jesse Helms submitted the Senate version of ASPA as an
amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, the House and
Senate agreed in conference committee on December 20, 2001 to
accept the House's Hyde Amendment. The House version is a
weaker, yet prohibitive piece of legislation intended to undermine
U.S. cooperation with the ICC by barring the use of Defense
Department funds for any related activities. The Hyde Amendment
does not contain waivers and will expire at the end of the 2002 fiscal
year, but continued opposition to the ICC is expected
By opposing the ICC, the U.S. has broken ranks with all of its
allies, except for Israel.6 Even more surprising is the fact that U.S.
opposition has placed it on the same ground as China and countries
the U.S. has referred to as "rogue" states, such as Iraq and Libya.7 In
October 2001, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer warned U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell that "the ASPA would open a rift
between the U.S. and the European Union on this important issue."8
As reflected by both versions of the ASPA and statements made
by U.S. officials, the U.S. government's position is that the ICC
3. See generally H.R. 1794; S. 1610; Press Release, The International Herald Tribune,
Bush Administration Wants War Crimes Court Curtailed at http://www.iht.com/cgi-
bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=49794 (visited March 2, 2002)
[herinafter Bush Administration]; "Scare Tactics," supra note 1; Anti-ICC, supra note 1.
4. See generally H.R. 1794; S. 1610; "Scare Tactics," supra note 1; Anti-ICC, supra
note 1.
5. See generally H.R. 1794; S. 1610; "Scare Tactics," supra note 1; Anti-ICC, supra
note 1.
6. Geopolitics - International Criminal Court at http://www.globalissues.com/
Geopolitics/ICC.asp (last visited Jan. 2,2001) [hereinafter Geopolitics].
7. d.
8. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Waiver Needed for War Crimes
Court: Senate Legislation a "New Low for Human Rights," at http://www.hnv.org/
press/2001/12/ASPA1210.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
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Treaty is flawed because it is legally and politically illegitimate.9
However, the ICC Treaty is not flawed. In actuality, it is the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), forums the U.S.
strongly supports, that can validly be seen as legally and politically
illegitimate. 0 That is, many of the U.S. government's criticisms of the
legal and political structure of the ICC can be more appropriately and
effectively leveled at the ICTY. This Note argues that it is not the
ICC treaty, but rather U.S. foreign policy towards the international
criminal tribunals that is flawed.
Part I discusses the past efforts to create international criminal
courts that led to the creation of the ICTY and the imminent
development of the ICC. Part II juxtaposes the advantages and
disadvantages of the ICTY being created by the Security Council with
the treaty approach taken by the ICC. In Part III, the legal legitimacy
of the Security Council constructing the ICTY will be criticized, while
legality of the ICC will be defended in relation to third party states
and the U.S. Constitution. Part IV will show how the ICTY is
politically illegitimate because it encumbers sovereignty and is
politically dependent upon the Security Council. Conversely, the
discussion will focus on how the ICC pays deference to sovereignty,
and in addition to being truly independent, is controlled by the
Security Council only enough to prevent politically motivated attacks.
Finally, this Note will conclude that the U.S. must reformulate its
foreign policy to support instead of impede the ICC. To criticize the
ICC and support the ICTY, a tribunal to which those criticisms more
9. See H.R. 1794; S. 1610; Press Release, Helms Statement Offering American
Service Members' Protection Act As Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill at
http:llvww.senate.gove/-foreign/minority/press-template.cfin?randsid= 179880 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002).
10. See H.R. 1794; S. 1610. I am using the ICTY and not the very similar International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") for comparison with the ICC, because the
Security Council created the ICTY without being requested by the countries involved or
the General Assembly, and therefore, it better illustrates the wide gap between the U.S.
view of a legally and politically legitimate international criminal tribunal and an
international criminal tribunal with significant legal and political legitimacy. While the
Bush Administration has recently criticized the integrity, efficiency, and cost of the
processes of the ad hoc tribunals and requested that they conclude by 2007-2008 to the
chagrin of U.S. allies and Democrats in Congress, the Bush Administration has not
withdrawn its support of the tribunals and has not ruled out the use of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals in the future. See generally Press Release, MSNBC News Services, U.S.
Building War Crimes Case Against Saddam at http://wvw.msnbc.comlnews!716935.asp
(visited March 1, 2002); Bush Administration, supra note 3.
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fairly apply, is hypocrisy. The U.S. must not let its power cloud its
judgment.
I. History
At the end of World War I, momentum for a permanent
international criminal court slowly began to build." The Treaty of
Versailles called for the establishment of an international criminal
tribunal to try the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm, for "a supreme
offense against morality and the sanctity of treaties," but he never
actually stood trial.'2 More importantly, a treaty providing for an
international criminal tribunal to try Turkish leaders accused of
slaughtering millions of Armenians was never ratified, and the alleged
perpetrators were granted amnesty. 3
However, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals set up after
World War II were much more effective. 4 These tribunals were
temporary and did not try many people, but they set important
precedents. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, adopted in
August 1945, clarified what crimes were to be prosecuted under
international law: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. 6  The Nuremberg Tribunal reflected the
international community's support for holding individual offenders,
regardless of political status, responsible for acts that have become
unacceptable to common views of international law and morality.17
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals also discarded the defense of
state sovereignty for such horrific acts, and established principles of
accountability that were later enumerated in the 1950 U.N.
Declaration of Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment.'8
11. Jelena Pejic, Creating A Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 294 (1998) (citing
Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43).
12. Id.
13. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11,
17 (1997).
14. Pejic, supra note 11 at 295-96.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 294-95 (citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
286,288).
17. Id at 295-96.
18. Id. at 295 (citing 1950 U.N. Declaration of the Principles of the Nuremberg
Charter and Judgment, cited in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
141 (1987)).
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The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention
in 1948, which defined genocide and provided that an accused could
be tried in a court of the state where the conduct occurred or in an
international court if the states concerned were willing to relinquish
jurisdiction to it. The four Geneva Conventions, which opened for
signature in 1949, bound signatory states to penalize, under domestic
law, acts considered "grave breaches" of the convention, such as
failure to protect wounded or sick soldiers, sailors, prisoners, and
civilians.2 Two Additional Protocols were added to the Geneva
Conventions in 1977, which concerned the duties of states to protect
individuals in international and non-international armed conflicts.2'
While the Genocide and Geneva Conventions were being
drafted, the United Nations General Assembly asked the
International Law Commission ("ILC"), an organization that is often
given the task of codifying and developing international law, to study
the possibility of creating a permanent international criminal court.2
The ICC produced two drafts of potential legislation in attempts to
establish an international criminal court, but further work was halted
when the intensifying Cold War political and ideological battles made
such a forum increasingly unfeasible. 3
In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago refocused attention on the
possibility of an international criminal court, by proposing that one be
created to deal with international drug trafficking.24  In 1992,
19. Id. (citing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 11, 1948,102 stat. 3045,78 U.N.T.S. 277,280,282 (1950).)
20. Id (citing Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
3146, 5 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva Convention Relative the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316,3420,75 U.N.T.S. 135,238; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 147,6 U.S.T. 3516,3618,75 U.N.T.S. 287,388).
21. Id at 296 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and relating to the victims of international armed conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to
protections of victims of non-international armed conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609).
22. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th mtg. at 177, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948)).
23. Id. (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory
Committee's Work, in International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues Before the
1997-98 Preparatory Committee; Administrative and Financial Implications 5, 5 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1997)).
24. Id at 297.
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compelled by the atrocities occurring in the former Yugoslavia, the
General Assembly requested that the ILC make it a priority to draft a
statute for the creation of a permanent international criminal
tribunal.' One year later, a draft ICC statute was submitted by the
ILC to the General Assembly."'
Also in 1993, when reports of violations of international
humanitarian law coming out of the former Yugoslavia began to
increase, the Security Council created the ICTY.27 The ICTY was
granted subject matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, violations of laws and customs of war, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.' This milestone in the global commitment
to international criminal law led to the establishment of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda a year later and enhanced the
outlook for establishing a permanent international criminal court.'
Finally, in July of 1998, after five years of negotiations, the
international community overwhelmingly approved the ICC Statute
as 120 nations voted yes and only seven voted no.' The seven that
voted no were the U.S., Israel, China, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and
Yemen." President Clinton did eventually sign the treaty only hours
before the deadline of December 31, 2000.32 However, he signed only
to ensure that the U.S. would be able to participate in and have an
effect on the ICC in future negotiations before it comes into
existence-despite his continued belief that the ICC Statute was a
25. Id. (citing G.A. Res. 47133, U.N. GAOR 47th Sess., 73d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/33 (1992)).
26. Id at 298 (citing Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/48/10 (1993)).
27. Id. at 291, 297. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY), S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); S.C. Res. 752 U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3075th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RESI752 (1992); S.C. Res. 757 U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 2-6, U.N. Doc. S/RE/757 (1992)).
28. Pejic, supra note 11 at 297 (citing Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, arts 2-5, at 36-38, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993)).
29. IM. at 297-98 (citing The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Rwanda
("ICTR"), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994)).
30. Geopolitics, supra note 6.
31. Id.
32. Clinton's Statement on War Crimes Court, BBC News, Dec. 31, 2000 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_10950001095580.stm (last visited Jan. 3,
2002).
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flawed treaty that would never be ratified by the Senate.3 China,
Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, and Rwanda did not sign the treaty by the
deadline and have yet to sign it.Y
According to Article 126 of the ICC Statute, it will not become
effective until sixty countries have ratified the treaty.35 As of January
2, 2002, forty-eight states had ratified the treaty, many of which are
U.S. allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
and Canada.' Yugoslavia has also ratified the treaty; however, as
evidenced by the ASPA, the U.S. is a long way from cooperating with
the ICC, much less ratifying the treaty.37  The requisite sixty
ratifications are expected to be achieved by the end of 2002.3
II. Creation
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The initial will to create the ICTY did not actually originate
within the Security Council and the governments of the powerful
states that control it.39 The ICTY was not created because of the
inherent value in punishing war criminals nor to fortify the rule of
law.' Rather, the grisly pictures beamed around the world by
television networks mobilized the citizenry of the powerful states, and
in turn, the political institutions that control the Security Council.4
In 1993, the Security Council issued Resolution 808, which stated
that an international tribunal would be established to prosecute
persons responsible for committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
199142 However, the resolution did not indicate how such an
international tribunal was supposed to be established or on what legal
33. Id.
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Ratification at
http://wwv.igc.org/ html/country.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Ratification
Status].
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,183/9, art.
126 at 87 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
36. Ratification Status, supra note 34.
37. 1I
38. Id
39. Macao Matua, Never Again: Questioning The Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167,174 (1997).
40. hI
41. 1i
42. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
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basis. 3 The Secretary General defended the action and pointed out
that the Security Council had, on other occasions, passed resolutions
under Chapter VII aimed at restoring and maintaining international
peace and security, which involved the establishment of subsidiary
organs for other purposes.' In defending Resolution 808, the
Secretary General made reference to Security Council Resolution 687
(1991) and subsequent resolutions relating to the situations between
Iraq and Kuwait.45
Unfortunately, the General Assembly had little involvement in
the ICTY's creation. 6 China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Yugoslavia
all voiced concerns that the Security Council, not the more
democratic forum of the General Assembly, was being utilized.47 One
of the many disadvantages to not employing the General Assembly is
that if the Security Council acts in relation to a situation, the General
Assembly cannot make recommendations unless invited by the
Security Council.'
The Secretary General stated two reasons why the ICTY was
created through the Security Council as opposed to the General
Assembly. The Secretary General's first reason was that he was
concerned that a treaty might not be ratified by some member states
that were considered integral to its success. "[T]here could be no
guarantee that ratifications will be received from those States which
should be parties to the treaty if it is truly to be effective."51
Nevertheless, the General Assembly can be seen as having given its
consent to the ICTY's creation by the Security Council because the
General Assembly nominated the ICTY's judges, approved its
budget, and passed resolutions in support of the tribunal. 2 However,
the General Assembly was not allowed to object in any manner to the
43. Id.
44. United Nations: Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
32 I.L.M. 1159, 1169 (July 1993) [hereinafter Sec. Gen. Report].
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1168.
47. See Joshua M. Koran, An Analysis of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 43, 49,
n.29 (1998).
48. UN CHARTER arts. 11(2), 12,24.
49. Koran, supra note 47, at 49.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security




ICTY's language, jurisdiction, sanctions powers, criminal procedure
and evidence rules, or even structure, such as its lack of an Office of
Defense.5 3
Second, it was believed that utilizing the Security Council would
expedite the process." In fact, the ICTY's rules of criminal procedure
were drafted in less than four months, and the tribunal was completed
in less than seven months.5  The speed with which the ICTY was
created resulted in imprecise drafting of the statutory language. 6 For
example, Article I stated that the ICTY had the power to "prosecute
persons responsible" for serious violations, but if drafted with
precision, the statute would have stated that the ICTY had the power
"to try persons allegedly responsible for" or "accused of" serious
violations.' That is, before someone is prosecuted and convicted,
they are not considered to be responsible for a crime."
Conversely, the care put into negotiation of a treaty combined
with utilization of the General Assembly considerably minimizes even
the most minute flaws. Although many international officials and
scholars believed that achieving unanimity in the General Assembly
would have taken much longer than it did in the Security Council, the
General Assembly has in fact passed resolutions concerning the
Yugoslavia situation that were not prompted by the Security
Council.5 9 Despite the lack of Security Council involvement, these
resolutions have been honored.6
B. The ICC
The treaty approach to the establishment of the ICC had the
advantage of allowing for a "detailed examination and elaboration of
all the issues" that are involved in an international tribunal.6' The
Secretary General has acknowledged that the treaty approach has an
53. Id. at 49-50.
54. Id at 50.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id (quoting Howard S. Levre, The Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 1, 26 (1995)).
58. Id.
59. Id.; Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 417,438 (1999).
60. Bodley, supra note 59. (citing G.A. Res. 48188, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda
Item 42, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/88 (1993) (urging Security Council to lift arms embargo on
Bosnia)).
61. Sec. Gen. Report, supra note 44, at 1168.
April 2002]
advantage, because it allows the states participating in the negotiation
and conclusion of the treaty to fully exercise their sovereign will.62
This sovereign will is executed when deciding whether or not to
become a party to a treaty.3
Many states and scholars also prefer the treaty approach because
it often utilizes the General Assembly, a truly representative and
democratic forum.' Some crucial advantages of establishing a
tribunal by treaty are: (1) the participation of all United Nations
member states gives it greater legitimacy; (2) signatory states can not
later dispute the legitimacy of its establishment, and (3) a generality
of states considering themselves legally bound to a treaty would
provide evidence of the consensus necessary to create international
customary law, which would eventually bind even non-signatory
states if they do not persistently object.'
Establishing the ICC by treaty gives it many advantages over,
and greater legitimacy than, the ICTY's creation through a Security
Council resolution. This greater legitimacy will help to minimize the
perception that the ICC dispenses victor's justice, thereby better
promoting long-term peace and reconciliation.
M. Legal Legitimacy
A. The ICTY
Many States and organizations that have drafted tribunal
statutes, such as the draft of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), have questioned the legal
legitimacy of the ICTY's creation.6' The CSCE draft took the view
that such a tribunal could only be created by a convention or through
the influence of the General Assembly.67
The source of international law often determines which court will
have jurisdiction.6' For instance, when international law originates
from a treaty, the treaty is first studied to determine the appropriate
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Koran, supra note 47, at 48.
65. Id.
66. Bodley, supra note 59.
67. Id.
68. Koran, supra note 47, at 56-57.
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judicial body." When international law originates from custom,
custom is first studied to determine the appropriate judicial body.'
Treaties often obligate the contracting states to prosecute certain
criminal offenses listed in the treaty, but both national and
multinational courts can be granted jurisdiction to try criminal
violations of international law.' However, no treaty which defines
war crimes authorizes the ICTY to try alleged violations.' Moreover,
no international agreement that codifies international humanitarian
law grants to the United Nations the power to adjudicate individual
criminal cases.'
It has been argued that the ICTY is legally illegitimate, because
its creation by the Security Council through the UN Charter was ultra
vires, and therefore, violates Article 14(1) of the International
Convention on the Protection of Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR").74 The ICCPR is an important treaty concerning
international humanitarian law, and Articlel4(1) guarantees an
accused the right to be tried by a tribunal "established by law." 7'
However, what does "established by law" mean?
Defense council for Dusko Tadic, the first defendant to appear
before the ICTY, argued before the Trial and Appeals Chambers that
"established by law" meant law passed by a legislative body, and
therefore, the ICTY was not a legally legitimate tribunal and violated
14(1).76 The European Commission on Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights agreed with this interpretation
when examining the European Convention on Human Rights.'
Yet, the Secretary General stated that in establishing the ICTY,
the Security Council was not creating or purporting to "legislate" that
law. 8 Rather, the international tribunal would have the task of
applying existing international humanitarian law. Additionally, by
requiring a tribunal to be established by a legislature, judge made law




72. Id at 58.
73. Id. at 61.
74. Id at 51,61.
75. Id
76. Id at 50-52.
77. Id at 52.




cease to be law.' War criminals are charged with many crimes that
stem from customary international law."1 Therefore, the Appeals
Chamber decided that since there is not an international legislature
that can promulgate binding laws on individuals, this interpretation of
a tribunal "established by law" did not apply to the international
sphere."
However, if the Security Council can't create international law
that is binding on individuals, how can the Security Council legally
create a judicial body whose jurisdiction is binding on individuals?'
Given that the ICTY's creation expanded the jurisdiction of
international political bodies to try individuals, the Security Council
can be seen as having in fact prescribed international law ultra vires.4
A second viable interpretation of "established by law" is that a
court is legally created by a political body, such as the Security
Council, whose decisions are binding on other political branches
within its organizational structure. 5  The Appeals Chamber
concluded that ICTY should be considered "established by law" if the
Security Council acted within its enumerated powers under the
United Nations Charter.86 Therefore, if the Security Council can
make binding decisions on the Secretary General or the General
Assembly on issues within its enumerated powers then the ICTY was
"established by law."' '
The Security Council can in fact make binding decisions on other
political organs within the United Nations; however, its enumerated
powers do not include jurisdiction and the ability to make binding
decisions over individuals.' As the Appeals Chamber indicated, the
Security Council under Chapter VII has authority to take action in
the former Yugoslavia, but the ability to act does not increase the
scope of what action they can choose or give it the power to create a
criminal court legally binding on individuals.' In addition, the
precedent setting judgments of the ICTY create new international
humanitarian law, a power beyond that of the organ that created it.?0




84. See id. at 53-55.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 53-54.
87. Id at 54.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 55.
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Given that a political body cannot delegate to a subsidiary organ
power it does not have and the ICTY is not authorized to create new
international law, it should be limited by the historical limits of the
jurisdiction of the Security Council.9' The Security Council has never
asserted power over individuals in the past, and therefore, the ICTY
cannot, under international law, have the power of jurisdiction over
individuals.' The Security Council acted ultra vires by creating a
subordinate body and granting it powers it could not exercise itself.
A third interpretation is that "established by law" means having
fair procedures. 9 While the ICTY does satisfy this interpretation, this
alone is probably not sufficient to satisfy Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.94
The Appeals Chamber ultimately dodged the issue by stating
that Article 14(1) of the ICCPR applied only to national courts, which
is consistent with a view that this right does not result from being a
natural entitlement.9' This view would mean that rights of the
accused are different under international law than under national
law.9" Some scholars have argued that the Appeals Chamber might
have been implying that the human rights belonging to individuals are
less protected under international law than under national law.'
Regardless, the Appeals Chamber's attempt to reconcile the ICTY's
legal creation with the requirement of Article 14(1) was
unsatisfactory. The simple fact that the ICTY's creation is
incompatible with a key international humanitarian treaty clearly
makes its legal legitimacy very questionable."
B. The ICC
(1) Legal Legitimacy in Relation to Third Party States
A major U.S. objection to the legal legitimacy of the ICC is that
it binds third party states who have not ratified the Treaty by
subjecting their nationals to its jurisdiction.? Therefore, the U.S.
argues that the ICC violates Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on
91. Id. at 62.
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id. at 56.
94. 1t
95. d. at 51-52.
96. Id.
97. Idt at 50-51.
98. See id.
99. H.R. 1794, 107th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2001); S. 1610, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001);
James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms Declined: The United States and the International
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 105, 134-35 (2000).
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the Law of Treaties: "a treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third state without its consent."'0° This objection involves
the preconditions necessary for the ICC to have jurisdiction over an
individual without a Security Council mandate.0 '
Absent a Security Council mandate, the accused must have
either committed one of the enumerated crimes within the territory of
a state party or be the national of a state party." Therefore, nationals
of a state not a party to the treaty can be tried by the ICC if the acts
occurred within the territory of a state party."3 This scenario does not
create new obligations for the third party states."' A state's citizens
are subject to foreign law when traveling abroad unless the situation
is otherwise governed by a treaty or internal law that grants an
exemption, such as a status of forces agreement or diplomatic
immunity."' The right to specify how and where the trial should take
place is certainly within the state's discretion.' 6  This territorial
jurisdiction to prescribe law is a result of the sovereign right to subject
those within a state's borders to its domestic law."7 When a state
party ratifies the ICC Treaty, the agreement becomes part of that
state's domestic law." If the U.S. fails to ratify the ICC Treaty, its
nationals will be subject to foreign law on foreign soil at that
sovereign's discretion, just as before."
More importantly, the ICC doesn't create new obligations for
third party states concerning the right of each to police its own
territory."' This right is inherent in the concept of sovereignty and
can only be restricted by its consent or jus cogens norms."' The U.S.
cannot credibly claim the ICC Treaty is legally illegitimate, because if
it is not ratified by the U.S., party states will not be forced to grant
immunity from the ICC's jurisdiction to Americans for acts occurring
within their own sovereign territory."' The ICTY rather than the ICC
100. Taulbee, supra note 99 at 135; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
101. See Taulbee, supra note 99 at 135-36.
102. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 12(2).
103. Id.












works to bind third party states to obligations when state consent is
lacking. Unlike the ICTY, the ICC does not have the express power
to issue orders to a third party state such as: to defer jurisdiction, to
cooperate with investigations, or to surrender suspects."'
The U.S. cannot credibly argue that the ICC Treaty is flawed
because it applies to U.S. nationals on foreign soil without U.S.
ratification, but does not apply to Saddam Hussein's acts within Iraq
if that state does not ratify.' First, jurisdiction over internal affairs of
a third party state would be considered a third party obligation
created by treaty that would violate the Vienna Convention on
Treaties."5 Second, the Security Council can use the very United
Nations Charter Chapter VII powers that created the ICTY to refer
the situation in Iraq to the ICC, even if Iraq does not ratify the ICC
Treaty.
6
(2) Legal Legitimacy in Relation to the U.S. Constitution
Many U.S. critics have objected to the court on constitutional
grounds. However, by juxtaposing U.S. extradition procedure with
ICC procedure, it becomes apparent that there are no constitutional
difficulties."7 The major constitutional objection to ratifying the ICC
is that the U.S. government cannot grant the ICC jurisdiction over its
citizens, because (1) the ICC does not possess constitutional criminal
procedural guarantees such as the right to trial by jury and (2)
international criminal law is not sufficiently well defined to give fair
notice and satisfy the due process standards of the U.S.
Constitution."' The U.S. also argues that it is required to exercise
potential jurisdiction whenever possible to ensure the existence of
113. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 29 [hereinafter ICTY Statute] and International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia Rules of Evidence and Procedure, rule 61, American Society for
International Law, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 33 IL.M. 484, 497 (1994) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Evid.
& Proc.] with ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 12.
114. Taulbee, supra note 99, at 131-32,150.
115. Id.; ICC Statute, supra note 35, 13(b); Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 34.
116. Taulbee, supra note 99, at 131-32, 150; ICC Statute, supra note 35, 13(b); Vienna
Convention, supra note 100, art. 34.
117. See Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the
Sword Mightier Than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 213, 245 (2000) (citing Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Criminal Court, S. Rep. No. 103-71 19-20, 24
(1993); H.R. 1794, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1610,107th Cong. (2001)).
118. Id. at 245-49.
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constitutional guarantees." 9  On the contrary, after examining
established interpretations of Article III and the role of the U.S.
judiciary, it becomes evident that the U.S. can constitutionally ratify
and participate in the ICC.Y
Ratifying the ICC Treaty would not implicate the structural
provisions of Article III because the ICC is not a court of the United
States.' Rather, the ICC is an independent international
organization that acts under its own authority and applies its own
law." The ICC exercises the judicial power of the international
community and not that of any individual state." As there is no
invocation of U.S. judicial power in the procedural structure of the
ICC, difficulties under Article III do not arise. 4
It has been demonstrated that the U.S. can participate in
international law enforcement without implicating Article LI"Y The
United States has routinely provided assistance to foreign countries in
gathering evidence and detaining suspects under extradition or
mutual assistance treaties, without it becoming the exercise of the
judicial branch. 6 For example, in Dames & Moore v. Reagan, the
judiciary was not involved when the U.S. suspended its claims and
transferred the prosecution to an international tribunal created by
bilateral agreement.' 3 This separation between international criminal
tribunals and U.S. jurisprudence is also indicated by Hirota v.
MacArthur, where the International Military Tribunal ("IMT")
convicted Japanese officials for crimes against humanity. In
deciding to deny the Japanese leave to institute a habeas action, the
Supreme Court determined that the IMT was "not a tribunal of the
United States" and "the courts of the United States [had] no power or
authority to review, to affirm, to set aside or annul judgments and
sentences."' 29  Through this holding, the Court displays the
119. I& at 250-51
120. Id. at 245.
121. l1i
122. Id
123. Id. (citing Louis L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 198-99
(1972)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 245-46.
126. Id. at 246.
127. See id- (citing Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 713, n.
9 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]).




independent structural relationship that exists between the U.S.
judicial system and an international criminal court.30
When compared with U.S. extradition law, the legal processes of
the ICC further illustrate the lack of a conflict between the U.S.
Constitution and ratification of the ICC Treaty.' In fact, the United
States has participated in extradition treaties in the past that were
"cooperative effort[s] of the international community to address
criminal activities creating difficulties in several states."'32 The crimes
to be charged by the ICC are not derived from U.S. law even though
the U.S. could legislate the criminalization of those offenses.' 33 The
only role the U.S. would play if it ratified the ICC Treaty would be to
detain and deliver the accused to the external jurisdiction of the ICC
if the U.S. chooses not to prosecute." This relationship is no
different from that which exists between the judicial power of U.S.
courts and extradition treaties.35
Examining the parameters of judicial review of extradition
treaties reveals that constitutional objection to the ICC on the basis
of inadequate ICC trial procedures is untenable.'36 Applying the rule
of non-inquiry, U.S. courts do not consider the procedural or
substantive rights the accused will have in the requesting state if the
extradition is authorized by treaty.'37 The courts' inquiries are
prevented pursuant to the rule that "by the existence of an
extradition treaty [it will] assume the trial will be fair.', 3' The courts
are unable to inquire into the procedures the accused will experience,
because that is the responsibility of the State Department.
39
This rule of non-inquiry prevents U.S. courts from scrutinizing
legal systems that differ substantially from that of the U.S., including
systems that significantly limit a defendant's rights at trial, those that
permit trial in abstentia, and those in which the defendant may face
torture or death."4  Conversely, the ICC provides for adequate
130. See id.
131. See id. at 246-47.
132 Id. at 247.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. (citing Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993)).
136. Id. at 24748.
137. Id. at 248-49.
138. Id. at 248 (citing Guksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508,512 (1911)).
139. Id (citing Garcia-Guillen v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) (citation omitted)).
140. Id. (citing Escobedo v. U nited States., 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); Gallina
v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960); In re Smith, 820
F. Supp. 498,502 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
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protection of individual rights and is subject to those guaranteed by
international law as specified in treaties and other sources of
international law.' The protections afforded to a suspect by the ICC
compare favorably with the minimal constitutional protections
afforded to suspects under U.S. extradition treaties.142 Thus, there
cannot be valid constitutional objections to ratifying the ICC treaty
due to inadequate trial procedures. 3
Moreover, the U.S. has not asserted that U.S. citizens could not
be tried under the trial procedures of the ICTY if their actions subject
them to the ICTY's temporal and territorial jurisdiction.'" If a U.S.
soldier on a peace-keeping mission in Kosovo committed a war crime
in 1998, according to the ICTY Statute, he would fall within the
ICTY's jurisdiction and if brought into custody would be tried
without a jury.45
The objection that international criminal law is
unconstitutionally vague is also unfounded as the U.S. has already
accepted definitions of crimes under international law as adequately
precise.4 6 For example, it has been determined that the international
law definition of piracy is defined well enough to be incorporated into
U.S. domestic law. More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has
decided that statutes drawing upon international law and providing
for trials for violation of war crimes have been sufficiently well
defined. 4' As stated, according to the ICTY Statute, an American
could fall within its jurisdiction and would be charged with crimes
defined by international law.'49
Seeing as the ICC is prospective and "relies on existing treaties,
the national laws implementing them," and already existing
international norms, the treaty provides fair notice of subsequent
141. Id- (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52-56, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR. 3d Sess., at 135, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
142. Id at 248-49.
143. Id In fact, the ICC standards of due process are considered by some to be
considerably higher than those of military tribunals President Bush wants to set up for
suspected terrorists. See Human Rights Watch, Europe Should Oppose U.S. Law on War
Crimes Court, at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/ASPeu121O.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2002).
144. ICrY Statute, supra note 113, arts. 1, 8, 15,23.
145. Id. arts. 1, 8,23.
146. Bickley, supra note 117, at 249.
147. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820)).
148. IM. (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942)).
149. See ICTY Statute, supra note 113, arts. 2,3,4,5,8.
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prosecution for the enumerated crimes.15 Despite the fact that a
crime might be defined differently under U.S. law, extradition is not
barred unless the underlying conduct does not constitute a serious
crime in the U.S. 5' Therefore, even if the precise requirements of a
trial under the U.S. Constitution are not met, the relationship
between the U.S. and the ICC does not violate the Constitution on a
procedural or substantive basis.'52
Another U.S. objection is that it would be unconstitutional to
allow an international criminal court to have jurisdiction over acts
within U.S. territory, when the U.S. has custody of the suspect, or
when the suspect is a U.S. citizen, because the U.S. would be forced
to give up jurisdiction it would otherwise be entitled to exercise over
the accused.'53 However, the Supreme Court has in fact "rejected the
idea that the U.S. is required by the Constitution to exercise
jurisdiction whenever possible" to ensure the existence of
constitutional guarantees."' The U.S. is not forced to exercise
jurisdiction over all crimes within its territorial boundaries as is
evidenced by U.S. domestic practice and policy towards other
nations.55 There is extensive precedent for the constitutionality of
extraditing defendants to foreign jurisdictions for trial based on acts
committed within U.S. territory. 56
The Constitution also does not prevent the U.S. from waiving
jurisdiction it has abroad, even over crimes committed by its
nationals.'57 Just consider the "long-standing U.S. rejection of the
civil law of some" states that "utilize nationality-based jurisdiction
under which they refuse to extradite their own nationals but offer to
try them in a domestic court."'" Given the opportunity, the U.S. has
never and probably will never insist on giving a domestic trial to all
150. Bickley, supra note 117, at 249; See generally ICC Statute, supra note 35.
151. Bickley, supra note 117, at 249 (citing Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579-
80 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338
(6th Cir. 1993)).
152. 1d. at 249-50.
153. I& (citing American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal
Court, New York State Bar Association Joint Report with Recommendations to the
House Delegates: Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Aug. 1993), reprinted
in 27 INT'L LAW. 257,268-69 (1993) [hereinafter American Bar]).
154. lad at 251 (citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524,530 (1957) (per curiam)).
155. Id.
156. Id at 252 (citing Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1993); Valencia v. Scott,
Nos. CV 90-3745(RJD), CV 91-1959(RJD), 1992 WL 75036 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1992);
United States v. Melia, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981)).
157. Id. at 251 (citing Williams v. Froehlke, 490 F.2d 998, 1004 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974)).
158. Id. at 250 (citing American Bar, supra note 153, at 269).
April 2002]
U.S. citizens that are being sought for extradition. 9 The United
States has repeatedly recognized extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction
over non-nationals when exercising such jurisdiction. Therefore, it is
hypocritical for the U.S. to now claim that it is barred by the
Constitution from allowing a foreign court to apply the same principle
to get jurisdiction over an American."6° The Supreme Court has never
indicated that a connection between the defendant or the crime and
the U.S. would be grounds to defeat a claim to jurisdiction by a
requesting state. 6'
Moreover, the ICC utilizes universal jurisdiction as a basis for
extra-territorial authority over its enumerated crimes, and the United
States has repeatedly recognized universal jurisdiction over these
crimes."2 In view of the fact that these crimes are already subject to
foreign jurisdiction, the "United States cannot limit international
jurisdiction by refusing to ratify the ICC treaty."' '
The ICC is not a court of the U.S. under Article III.
Consequently, its relationship to U.S. jurisprudence resembles the
relationship between a foreign court and U.S. jurisprudence.'6
Through examination of the non-inquiry doctrine of extradition law,
it becomes apparent that the rights guaranteed to an accused are
adequate to defeat a constitutional challenge. In addition,
international criminal law does not violate due process, and the U.S.
is not constitutionally required to exercise all potential jurisdiction.
U.S. ratification of the ICC Treaty would be legally legitimate
because the Constitution does not bar the legal relationship that
would exist between the ICC and United States jurisprudence.
Conversely, the ICTY demanded that the former Yugoslavia change
its constitution so it could cooperate with the court by extraditing its
nationals.16 The U.S. cannot claim that the ICC is legally illegitimate
and maintain that the ICTY is not.
159. Id at 251 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 475 n.4).
160. Id. at 252.
161. Id. at 253.
162. Id at 251-52.
163. Id at 252.
164. Id. at 248-54.
165. Id- at248.
166. Bodely, supra note 59, at 437.





The principle of sovereignty bars "the exercise of jurisdiction by
one state over issues and individuals within the territorial boundaries
of another state."'67  The international community has repeatedly
recognized sovereignty as the most sacred and fundamental right that
a nation can possess.'6 Previously, Yugoslavia argued that its
sovereignty was being violated, because, inter alia, its internal
constitutional laws that prohibit extradition of its nationals, an
internal restriction of many states, would have to be changed to
comply with the ICTY.169 In fact, at the insistence of Security Council
and international donors, the government that replaced Milosevic had
to thwart public opinion and overrule its constitutional court to
facilitate his extradition to the ICTY.
70
The Security Council undermined state sovereignty by creating
the ICTY under its Chapter VII powers because it went against the
wishes of the states that were closely involved.' State sovereignty is
infringed upon when the ICTY demands extradition of nationals for
public trials. Sovereignty is further diminished when the ICTY makes
incursions into state territories for the purpose of collecting evidence
that will be used to prosecute its nationals." This disregard for state
sovereignty only increases the feeling of subjugation in states that are
already angered by a perceived prejudice against them." In fact, a
majority of Serbian citizens wanted Milosevic tried in Belgrade and
167. Bickley, supra note 117, at 255 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7).
168. Id (citing MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND
THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY, 11-12 (1995)).
169. Bodely, supra note 59, at 437. "[A]ll States shall take any measures necessary
under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the
Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with ... orders issued by a Trial
Chamber." ICTY Statute, supra note 113, art. 61 at 1189.
170. See The Agence France Press, Most Serbs Disapprove of Milosevic Extradition,
(Jul. 3, 2001), at http://www.igc.apc.org/globalpolicy/intljustice/tribunals/2001/O713serb.
htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002); Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Milosevic
Transferred to the Hague as ICC Moves One Ratification Closer to Entry into Force, at
http://wvw.igc.org/icc/html/pressrelease20010628a.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Milosevic Transferred].
171. See Bodely, supra note 59, at 437.




believed that the government was heavily pressured from the outside
into violating its own rule of law by unconstitutionally extraditing
him.'" This precedent illustrates that the Security Council could
easily use ad hoc tribunals for politically motivated attacks against
other states that may potentially encounter troubles similar to those
in Yugoslavia.7 5 Even if this particular situation deserved setting a
new precedent, the actions of the Security Council encroached
significantly upon the sovereignty of the nations involved.
Yet, the deepest encroachment upon sovereignty results from the
everyday powers that are granted to the ICTY and its prosecutor
through the Statute and Rules of Procedure.'76 Article 8 of the ICTY
Statute explains that the jurisdiction of the ICTY includes the entire
land and water surface and air space of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991." Therefore, the
ICTY, through its agents "may travel to and within the territory of
the former Yugoslavia... with or without permission from the states
involved[,] [for] purpose[s] consistent with the mandate of the
ICTY. 178 These agents must be admitted and cannot be arbitrarily
detained or arrested. 9 ICTY representatives must be allowed access
to destinations they wish to see if the request is consistent with the
mandate of the ICTY.'"
According to Rule 61, the ICTY can request all U.N. Member
Nations to take active roles in the arrest and capture of indicted war
criminals, including freezing assets.'81 In addition, Article 9 gives the
ICTY concurrent and superior jurisdiction to all national courts,
including those within the territory of the former Yugoslavia.2 The
ICTY has primacy over national courts, and at any stage of the
procedure may formally request the national courts to defer the case
to the ICTY."'
174. See Milosevic Transferred, supra note 170.
175. See id.
176. Bodley, supra note 59, at 454 (citing ICTY Statute and ICTY Rules of Evid. &
Proc., supra note 113).
177. Id.
178. Id
179. Id This is supported by Article 39 of the ICTY Statute which grants privileges and
immunities to the Tribunal, particularly the judges, the Prosecutor and his staff, and the
Registrar and his staff.
180. Id.
181. Bodley, supra note 59, at 454 (citing ICTY Statute and ICrY Rules of Evid. &
Proc., supra note 113, rule 61.)




Rule 9 of the ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure states that
when it appears to the prosecutor that: (i) the act being investigated
or which is the subject of those proceedings is characterized as an
ordinary crime; or (ii) there is a lack of impartiality or independence,
or the investigations or proceedings are designed to shield the
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not
diligently prosecuted; or (iii) what is in issue is closely related to, or
otherwise involves, significant factual or legal questions which may
have implications for investigations or prosecutions before the
[t]ribunal, the Trial Chamber can request that the State defer to the
competency of the court.'" The key provision is (iii), because it
grants the ICTY prosecutor almost unlimited discretion to make a
national court defer to the ICTY. Once the prosecutor decides to
pursue an individual, a national court's investigation and prosecution,
whether already undertaken or not, will almost certainly concern
legal and factual implications that bear upon a proceeding before the
ICTY. In fact, the first ICTY prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, stated
that the ICTY's primacy over a national court's jurisdiction is an
invasion of sovereignty.'
The ICTY Statute compels all states, not just U.N. members, to
cooperate fully. As a result, the ICTY gravely infringed upon the
sovereignty of the newly independent states emerging from the
former Yugoslavia by compelling their compliance before they
became U.N. members.'8 The new states were also required to
change or amend their domestic law if necessary to cooperate with
orders from the Trial Chamber.' State sovereignty is probably most
significantly infringed upon when a state is unable to withhold
evidence to safeguard its national security unless approved by the
184. ICTY Rules of Evid. & Proc., supra note 113, rule 9.
185. U.N. CHRON., vol. 33, no. 2, ISSN: 0251-7329, June 22, 1996 at 2, 4-5 [herinafter
U.N. CHRON.].
186. See Bodely, supra note 59, at 466-67.
187. See id. 465-466 (citing Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for
Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber II of July 18, 1977, at 3-4, Case No. IT-95-14-
A12108bis (Oct. 29, 1997), at http://www.un.org.ictylblasic/trialcl/decisionse/
70718sp2.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 1999) [herinafter Judgment on Request]).
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Trial Chamber." Such serious encroachments upon sovereignty have
understandably resulted in some states refusing to cooperate.s
(2) The ICC
The ICC Statute shows great deference to state sovereignty.
State sovereignty continues to play an integral role in international
relations, but no nation can expect to shield its affairs from any and
all external influence."9 Sovereign powers, immunities, and privileges
are subject to limitations despite their continued force and control in
international relations. 9' Over fifty years ago, the Nuremberg
Judgments established that state sovereignty was not an acceptable
defense when prosecuting individuals for violations of international
human rights law."
Ratifying the ICC and playing a role in human rights treaties is
consistent with a sovereign state's responsibility to protect its
nationals."9 Even if becoming a party to an international agreement
is seen as sacrificing a small amount of sovereignty, through this
agreement the state is able to gain protections that broaden and
enhance its sovereignty and power to protect its citizens.'94
In addition, sacrificing a small amount of sovereignty through
ratifying a treaty can be seen as an exercise of that sovereignty. 5 For
example, Liechtenstein has often exercised its national power by
choosing to forego making foreign relations decisions in favor of
188. See id. at 467 (citing Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Subpoena Issue-The Appeals Chamber Unanimously Quashes the
Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Croatia and the Defense Minister (Oct. 29, 1997), at
http://www.un.org/ICrY/p253-e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Subpoena
Issue]).
189. William Miller, Comment, Slobodan Milosevic's Prosecution by the International
Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia: A Harbinger of Things to Come for
International Justice, 22 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 553, 556-67 (2000) (citing
Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HoFSTRA L. & PoL'Y SYMP. 37,39 (1999)).
190. See Bickley, supra note 117, at 259 (citing Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent
International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 419,432 (1995)).
191. See id. (citing Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and International Law, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1695 (1995)).
192. See id. at 256-57 (citing Henry T. King, Nuremberg and Sovereignty, Address
Before the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 1995), in 28 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 135,136 (1996)).
193. See id. at 261 (citing Brand, supra note 191, at 1696).
194. See id. (citing Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court:
Where They Stand and Where They're Going, 30 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 391-92
(1992)).
195. See id. at 259-61.
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those made by Switzerland. 6 Unlike the states subject to the ICTY,
parties to the ICC treaty exercise the sovereign power of consent and
do not have legal processes imposed upon them by more powerful
states.
The ICC is not intended to displace functioning national judicial
systems. The aim is to prevent impunity when an independent and
effective judicial system is unavailable.1'9 The ICC must defer to
national courts, except in cases when those courts are "unwilling or
unable [to] genuinely" investigate or prosecute. 3 This principle is
called "complementarity" and can be invoked by interested sovereign
states and by an accused to block court encroachment upon
sovereignty. 99
Exceptions to the basic presumption of deferral to national
courts are very limited, especially when compared to the ICTY's
primary jurisdiction. Such authority gives the ICTY wide latitude to
decide which cases it would like to intervene in and hear.
"Unwillingness" in effect requires that national proceedings be
undertaken in bad faith before the ICC can intercede.' The use of
established and transparent judicial procedures precludes a finding of
unwillingness." ' Moreover, a finding of unwillingness is not made
merely because an investigation did not result in prosecution.' If a
state in good faith fulfills its duty to investigate and decides not to
prosecute, the ICC cannot act*2
3
"Inability" means "a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability" of the national courts.04 This exception would only
apply when a state's judiciary has substantially ceased to function and
not when it has an independent and functioning judicial system. 5
Complementarity is a concept that does not affect the sovereign
independence of national courts, because the ICC does not act as an
196. The Learning Network Inc., Liechtenstein: Land People, Economy, and
Government, at http:llwww.infoplease.comlce6/worldlAO859278.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2002).
197. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The United States Debate: Why the U.S.
Should Ratify the Rome Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court, part III-C,
(adapted from "The International Criminal Court: The Case For U.S. Support") at
http://www.igc.apc.org/icc/index.html [hereinafter U.S. Should Ratify].
198. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 17.
199. Id.
200. Id art. 17(2).
201. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197.
202. 1&
203. Id.
204. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 17(3).
205. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197.
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appellate court that second guesses a lower court's determinations of
fact and law relating to the merits of a case. 6
B. U.S. Political Control and Influence
(1) The ICTY
The ICTY is a judicial organ of the Security Council, but was
intended to function independently of political considerations and not
under the authority or control of the Security Council with regard to
the performance of its judicial functions.m Yet, the decision of when
to create an ad hoc tribunal is, in itself, a political decision. Richard
Goldstone has stated that he believes it is unjust for an inherently
political body like the Security Council to decide in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda what laws will be enforced while it ignores other conflicts
around the world. In fact, the Security Council ignored the
genocide in Rwanda for years after creating the ICTY. It took a
formal request from that weary and war-torn country before the
ICTY was even considered. Mr. Goldstone agreed with the
objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that the creation of
the ICTY was a political decision that resulted in discrimination.
21
Yugoslavia and others have argued that an independent tribunal,
especially an international one, cannot be a subsidiary organ of any
political body, including the Security Council.20 The status of the
Security Council as a political body generated widespread fear of its
inadequacy to sit in judgment of those accused of war crimes and
other atrocities. As a result, the Security Council created another
organization to act instead.' However, the tribunal cannot truly be
independent because it depends upon the Security Council for its
mandate and continued existence as a subsidiary organ.212  The
Security Council controls the very life span of the ICTY, so it is
guaranteed to be responsive to the Security Council's political goals
21 1
Former ICTY Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald even acknowledged
206. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 17.
207. Sec. Gen. Report, supra note 44.
208. U.N. CHRON., supra note 185, at 1.
209. Id.
210. Bodely, supra note 59, at 436,452-54.
211. Id. at 452.
212. Id
213. Id. at 453.
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the subordinate relationship of the ICTY to the Security Council
when she described it as a "creature" of the Security Council.2 4
The ICTY's use of Rule 61 best exemplifies its dependence upon
the Security Council. The ICTY uses Rule 61 when an initial warrant
has not been executed and, as a result, the indictment has not been
served upon the accused.21' After a Trial Chamber finds reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused has committed the crimes
charged, it endorses the indictment and issues an international arrest
warrant." An important aspect of this process is notifying the
Security Council. For example, if the prosecutor convinces the Trial
Chamber that the failure to personally serve the accused was a result
in whole or in part of a failure or refusal of a state to cooperate, the
prosecutor notifies the Security Council so that its orders are
enforced.217 When the ICTY under Article 29 makes a demand or
request, it must turn to the Security Council for enforcement.2 8
Clearly the ICTY is far from being independent as the Security
Council is its ultimate enforcement mechanism.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, the Appeals
Chamber decided that the ICTY did not have the power to issue a
subpoena or enforcement measures against sovereign states.
21 9
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the appropriate
legal remedy was for the court to make a finding of non-compliance
with a request and then refer the matter to the Security Council for
enforcement.' The Security Council need not act on every
occurrence of noncompliance, and may therefore exercise discretion
in choosing which ICTY orders will be enforced. When backed by an
entity as untouchable as the Security Council, the structure, function,
and broad powers of the ICTY can be used effectively as a powerful
political tool."
For example, the prosecutor is responsible for conducting
investigations and submitting indictments to the Trial Chamber and
has almost complete discretion as to whom the ICTY does and does
214. IL (citing Supeona Issue, supra note 188).
215. Bodely, supra note 59, at 456-57 (citing IcTY Rules of Evid. & Proc., supra note
113, at rule 61).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 456-57 (citing ICTY Statute, supra note 113, art. 29).
219. Id. at 463. (citing Judgment on Request, supra note 187.)
220. Id (citing Supeona Issue, supra note 188.)
221. Id at 466-67 (citing M. CHERF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 238 (1996)).
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not prosecute.' While this gives off the appearance of independence,
the prosecutor is actually powerless without the Security Council's
backing. Even though Richard Goldstone's team successfully
accumulated evidence and indicted many alleged criminals, the
Security Council refused to permit U.N. forces to take the necessary
steps towards arresting suspects.'m One major suspect, Ratko Mladic,
a former Bosnian Serb military chief, enjoyed skiing outings within
sight of NATO forces who were not authorized to make arrests."*
Another suspect even visited a U.N. police station to file a complaint
and was neither recognized nor detained.' Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic lived the life of a celebrity by appearing at
political rallies and publishing a best-selling volume of poetry in
Greece. "6 The prosecutor's power is limited in what it can do to
capture a suspect as it must rely on the Security Council's political
agenda. 7
Even before Milosevic's formal indictment, his treatment by the
ICTY was greatly affected by the political process.'m Milosevic signed
the Dayton Peace Accords, talks which were supposed to help bring
peace to the region, only after being granted de facto immunity from
prosecution by the ICTY.z29  This early political concession to
Milosevic displays the degree to which the ICTY is dependent on the
Security Council's political agenda.m In fact, it is likely that Milosevic
would never have been extradited without the political pressure that
the Security Council placed on Yugoslavia's new government."' As
an organ of the Security Council, the ICTY can only do its job when
the Security Council permits.
222. ICTY Statute, supra note 113, arts. 15-16.
223. Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting: Wants West to
Capture Big Fry, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22,1996, at 1.
224. K.C. Swanson, Troubled Tribunal, 13 NAT'L J. 739 (1996).
225. Jovan Kovacic U.S. Envoy Warns Serb President to Aid Tribunal, B. GLOBE, Nov.
8,1996, at A2, available at 1996 WL 6885098.
226. Alleged Serb War Criminal Turns Poetic: Book By Karadzic is a Big Seller in
Greece, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 25, 1996, at 20, available at 1996 WL 2739488.
227. See Miller, supra note 189, at 560-67 (citing Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,
Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 8, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.htm)).
228. See Miller, supra note 189, at 567-68 (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating
Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 409,418-19 (2000)).
229. Id. (Milosevic's later military actions in Kosovo breached the peace process and
negated his immunity).
230. Id. at 418.
231. Milosevic Transferred, supra note 170.
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The Security Council created the ICTY when confronted with
the international political decision of whether to become involved in
the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.' 2 Some have argued that a war
crimes tribunal does not exclude military action. 3 That is, the United
Nations was not required to view the ICTY as pre-empting the use of
force to impose a settlement in the former Yugoslavia.' If that is
true, the Security Council could use the military to defeat aggressive
forces and then prosecute those defeated in a war crimes tribunal."
However, this relationship between military force and a war crimes
tribunal produces victor's justice. A better solution is to genuinely
incorporate force, diplomacy, and a tribunal 6 This approach would
produce a fair outcome that parties would be psychologically
committed to and more likely to pass on to future generations to
prevent recurring conflict.237
Laws that cannot be applied or enforced without prejudice do
little to redress transgressions and deter future violations.23 Whether
an ad hoc tribunal should be created is a decision involving a selective
process that is subject to the whim of powerful states. 9  A truly
international tribunal is needed that can operate more freely from
politics, recognize the importance of national courts, and apply a
uniform standard of international criminal law to internal conflicts
everywvhere.24  When a national court lacks credibility with those
being prosecuted, an international tribunal virtually unrestrained by
political considerations would be an extraordinary asset.24' However,
the ICTY is prevented from filling this role by the political
atmosphere in which it was created and exists.242
It is not a surprise that only the treaty approach was advanced by
the special rapporteurs on Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia when
232. Matua, supra note 39.
233. Id at 175 (citing Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's
Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 281, 293 (1992) (reviewing
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs. (1992))).
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239. Id. (citing Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 554,555 (1995)).
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241. Id. In fact, trying international terrorists in the ICC would result in greater
international perception of legitimacy surrounding the proceedings and could eventually




they considered how to create a tribunal within the framework of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Moscow Human
Dimension Mechanism. 3  The correspondents concluded that
because the CSCE is as a political body, it does not possess the
legitimacy or competence to establish a tribunal through a resolution
and that only a treaty could be legitimately utilized.2' This conclusion
is just as easily reached when considering whether the Security
Council, as a political body, could legitimately create the ICTY.
(2) The ICC
(a) Security Council Trigger Mechanism
An examination of the trigger mechanisms used to start an
investigation in the ICC is important in analyzing U.S. political
influence and control over the ICC. The ICC Treaty enables the
Security Council to refer situations according to its power under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.' 5  When the Security Council
makes a referral, the ICC is able to exercise jurisdiction without
considering whether any interested countries have accepted the ICC's
jurisdiction. 6 Therefore, only the Security Council is able to exercise
the most powerful jurisdictional reach of the ICC. The Security
Council, under its Chapter VII powers, can refer any situation it
deems appropriate, even in situations where the interested countries
are not members of the United Nations.247 The implication of this
setup is that the Security Council may never refer its own members to
the ICC, because each state wields the veto power on all Security
Council actions.
Moreover, the Security Council will have the power to defer
investigations or prosecutions for perpetually renewable twelve-
month periods.2" Most likely, the members of the Security Council
will act cohesively with self interest in rejecting political attacks on
any Security Council member. Each party state will want assistance
from the other members in defending future political attacks through
243. Roman A. Kolodkin, An Ad Hoc International Tribunal For the Prosecution of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM.
L.F. 381, 386 (1995) (citing CSCE Rapporteurs (Corell-Tfirk-Thune), CSCE Moscow
Human Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia, Proposal for an
International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc 5/25307 (1993)).
244. Id.
245. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art 13(b).
246. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197, at III(D).
247. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6 and art. 24, para. 1.
248. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 16.
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the ICC. As a result, each member nation will cooperate to help the
current member under attack through perpetual deferral. The level
of protection afforded to one party state will be afforded to all.
Interestingly, even if the United States does not ratify the ICC
Treaty, it can control the ICC through the Security Council. The
United States has many shields against political attacks by any ICC
party or prosecutor. However, the states in the former Yugoslavia
have no ability whatsoever to defend political attacks launched
against them by the Security Council or prosecutor through the
ICTY. In contrast to the ICC, the ICTY does not have adequate
procedural safeguards to prevent political attacks.
Therefore, it is hard to accept the argument of many opponents
of the ICC, such as Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), that the ICC is an
attempt to do an "end run" around the Security Council.249 The
absolute veto privilege possessed by individual members is resented
by numerous developing countries. Similarly, many U.S. allies
believe that extending absolute veto privileges to ICC investigations
and prosecutions would compromise the principle of a uniform global
standard of justice.' Interestingly, the most vocal critics of the
Security Council, India, Iraq, and Libya, refused to support the treaty,
while three of the five members of the Security Council voted for it."
(b) Prosecutor Trigger Mechanism
The ICC Treaty permits the prosecutor to initiate an
investigation on her own motion (propio motu). However, there are
many safeguards that ensure this power is not used for political
attacks. 2 This prosecutorial power is necessary for the ICC to be
effective, because the other trigger mechanisms will sometimes be
unreliable. The Security Council, as a political body, may not be able
to refer situations if only one of its members disagrees. In addition,
states may be reluctant to refer matters involving another state's
nationals if doing so might interfere with diplomatic or economic
relations or invite retaliation."3  Therefore, an independent
249. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197, at III(D); Cheryl K. Moralez, Establishing an
International Criminal Court: Will It Work?, 4 DE PAUL INT'L J. 135, 150-51 (Winter
2000).
250. Miller, supra note 189 (citing Bantram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855, 858-
59 (1999)).
251. See Ratification Status, supra note 34; Moralez, supra note 249, at 150-51.
252. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 13(c), 15.
253. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197, III(D).
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prosecutor is essential to combat situations brought about by the
ineffectiveness inherent with having only the two other trigger
mechanisms.
Nevertheless, the power of the ICC prosecutor is very limited,
and exercise of such is subject to strict scrutiny and procedural
safeguards. Before the prosecutor can initiate an investigation on her
own initiative, she must convince a panel of judges that the
investigation has a "reasonable basis" and that the case is within the
ICC's jurisdiction. The prosecutor is also required to defer to
investigations by national authorities, unless a panel of judges decides
that those authorities are unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate
or prosecute." The prosecutor must also defer proceedings for a
renewable twelve-month period at the request of the Security
Council *6  In addition, the prosecutor is limited to initiating
investigations in cases that involve either conduct within the territory
of states that have accepted the court's jurisdiction or acts committed
by the nationals of such states27 Many of these safeguards were
sponsored by the U.S. government and are included in the ICC
Treaty due mostly to U.S. persistence.' s
Unwarranted political attacks are also avoided because an
absolute majority of the Assembly of States Parties is required to
elect the prosecutor and one or more deputy prosecutors to
nonrenewable nine-year terms. 2 9  Another safeguard is that the
prosecutor and deputy prosecutors must be of different
nationalities.! Despite the significant level of control maintained by
the Security Council and the protections afforded it from political
attack, the ICC is an independent body, unlike the ICTY, which is an
organ dependent upon the Security Council.
According to the U.S. ambassador to the ICC, the United States
entered into the ICC negotiations with the goal of creating "a court
whose ability to act without a Security Council mandate would be
shaped in such a way as to protect against a misguided exercise of
authority that might harm national and international interests. 26
The goal of an independent and unbiased prosecutor has been
254. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 15(4).
255. Id. arts. 17 & 18.
256. Id. art. 16.
257. Id. art. 12.
258. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197, at 1II(D).
259. ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 42(4).
260. Id. art 42(2).
261. U.S. Should Ratify, supra note 197.
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achieved, but now the U.S. wants the ability to selectively immunize
any of its citizens from prosecution. The U.S. indicates its desire for
an independent prosecutor, but points to the dependent prosecutor of
the ICTY as a model, resisting the possibility of an even mildly
independent prosecutor.
Conclusion
During her closing statement concerning the adoption of the
ICTY Statute, then-ambassador of the United States, Madeline
Albright said, "of this we are certain: the Tribunal must succeed,
for... the credibility of international law in this new era."262 The U.S.
government has the right general outlook, but envisions the wrong
tribunal model to credibly secure a place for international criminal
law in the twenty-first century.
As opposed to ICTY's creation, the ICC has the immeasurable
advantages of being created by treaty, including greater international
legal legitimacy. In addition, unlike the politically influenced ICTY,
the ICC also has greater legitimacy, because it shows deference to
national sovereignty and is a truly independent tribunal that can only
be influenced by the Security Council enough to prevent political
attacks.
The U.S. must reexamine its flawed foreign policy and realize
that its criticisms of the ICC, given its support for the ICTY, are
hypocritical. The goals the U.S. had hoped the ICTY would
accomplish will be achieved more effectively and on a wider scale
through the ICC. The U.S. must not let its judgment concerning
foreign policy be overly influenced by its power. If the U.S. exercises
its sovereign will and ratifies the ICC Treaty, it would be a
momentous contribution to world order and, in the words of Justice
Jackson at his opening address to the Nuremberg Tribunal, be "one
of the most significant tributes that Power ever paid to Reason."'263
262. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993).
263. Robert H. Jackson, Opening Address for the United States at the Nuremberg
Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. 1, Chapter 5, (Part 1 of 17 at 114 (1946)),
available at http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca-01/nca-01-05-opening-address-
usa.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
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